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Refugees from the 1st through 4th Centuries:  Racial, Economic, Cultural, 
and Practical Issues along the Borders 
 
Much like our modern world, ancient refugees sought out Rome as a land of 
wealth and security.  The classical literary sources (e.g. Tacitus, Cassius Dio, 
Ammianus Marcellinus, etc.) have provided posterity with a wealth of descriptions of 
refugee incidents.  Through these accounts of refugees to and from Rome, we can piece 
together an understanding of Rome’s level of control over her borders, and more 
generally, over large population movements.  This process will also shed light on other 
issues such as motives, biases, and economic factors.  Based upon the incidents 
described by the classical historians throughout the 1st through 5th centuries, we see 
what appears to be an evident fluctuation in the level control exercised by the Romans.  
Furthermore, the contemporary awareness of the benefits and disadvantages of allowing 
refugees to in Rome will also be highlighted in this process.  Most importantly among 
all of these issues, simple economic gains and losses tend to be the most significant 
motive behind the actions of both the refugees and the Romans. 
Before moving on to specific examples, it is important to differentiate between 
what could be considered normal conquest or raiding and what constitutes a real refugee.  
The instances that will be examined here are examples of groups of people who were 
forced from their homes and sought refuge among the Romans en masse.  These groups 
were fleeing from death (via starvation, war, etc.) and sought permanent residence and 
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protection within Rome.  The factors affecting these refugee groups’ decision to migrate 
will be examined more thoroughly on a case by case basis to show relationships with 
respect to Rome’s ability to control these dispossessed peoples.  Like modern refugees 
(and immigration in general) push and pull factors influenced these decisions.  These 
can range from economic decline and cultural alienation to man-made catastrophe or the 
appeal of a more “civilized” society.1    
One of the earliest examples of refugees we find is left to us by Tacitus in the 
Annals when he provides a brief account of an event involving the Frisians and the 
Ampsivarii.  Tacitus tells us of the Frisians who attempted to settle in “clearings 
reserved [agrosque vacuos] for the use of the troops.”2  Upon this move, the Roman 
commander there threatened the Frisian leaders Verritus and Malorix, forcing them to 
seek Nero’s permission to settle, only to have their request later denied.3  This land was 
then immediately reoccupied by the “starving” Ampsivarii who, upon facing heavy 
pressure from Rome, did not give up the land so easily; instead, they opted to form an 
alliance in an attempt to fight the Romans.4  The motivations of these particular groups 
becomes rather apparent when viewed through Tacitus’ explanations.  Tacitus tells us 
that the Ampsivarii had been “expelled by the Chauci, and were now a homeless 
people.”5  Tales of groups of people who are forced to leave their land because another 
rival people has invaded that land is a major theme that appears throughout many of the 
incidents that will be examined later.  It is somewhat bizarre, however, given that the 
Ampsivarii attempted to fight the Romans for the land, but did not fight the Chauci who 
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had originally evicted them.  This decision must have been made for some unknown 
reasons possibly due to desperation or some other reason.  The Frisian’s desire to seek 
out Roman land, although not explicitly stated, can be easily deduced from the fact that 
they chose to settle where the land did not requiring clearing before engaging in 
agriculture.  This coupled with Rome’s reputation no doubt explains the Frisian 
refugee’s motives.  These people’s motivations were simply land hunger and the area 
that just happened to be cleared was appealing to them.  To the Romans, this act must 
have carried with it a great deal of symbolism, as the agri vacui were projections of 
Roman power into the barbarian territories.6  By moving into these spaces the 
Ampsivarii and Frisians threatened Roman interests, thus provoking a harsh reprisal. 
It is a little more difficult to understand why the Romans chose not allow them 
the right to settle on the empty land (agri vacui) outside of just sheer pride.  The agri 
decumates themselves served as a cleared area that was used by the Roman legions 
(both during active service and for land grants upon retirement) as look-out space near 
borders.  In addition to the obvious loss of this land that would be produced by allowing 
a barbarian group to settle on this land, the potentially dangerous effects of permitting a 
hostile barbarian group to settle along a border must be considered.  The Ampsivarii 
certainly attempted to persuade the Romans to the advantages of allowing the right to 
settle by claiming that Rome would be better served by having an ally on its border than 
by having pastureland.7  The right to settle on or within Roman territory (receptio) was 
a major tool employed during the Empire to control the barbarian populations.  Receptio 
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is described as the “practice of allowing an outside group to settle within the empire.”8  
Although this is not the exact word that Tacitus uses to describe the supplications of the 
Frisians and Ampsivarii, their actions do indeed fit the definition.  The potential gains 
of allowing supplicant refugees to settle on Roman territory were great.  The Empire 
could expect to gain increased taxes, increases in cultivated land (thus greater food 
production capacity), and perhaps most importantly (particularly in Late Antiquity) a 
larger recruiting base for the army among others.  Thus, when receptio is viewed as a 
tool of control, Nero’s decision to deny it to the Ampsivarii and the Frisians 
demonstrated to the barbarian peoples that Rome did not need the barbarians.  
Furthermore, it shows that Rome clearly had the power to wipe out those that defied her 
will.  This notion is supported by Tacitus, who recorded a statement that was made by 
the commander in the area, Dubius Avitus.  Dubius Avitus is recorded to have remarked 
to the Ampsivarii spokesman, Boiocalus, that, “people must submit to the rule of their 
betters; that the gods to whom they [Ampsivarii] appealed had willed that the decision 
as to what should be given or taken…, was to rest with the Romans.”9  This in itself is a 
powerful statement that reveals contemporary Roman attitudes of superiority towards 
refugees, and barbarians in general.  It also reinforces the idea of the use of receptio as a 
tool of control because the gods granted Rome the power to decide the fate of others.  
Thus, this notion of control is elevated to even a religious level by these comments. 
Due to the relative lack of information that Tacitus provides, it is rather difficult 
to determine clearly if Nero (and the Romans in general) were fully aware of the 
benefits of allowing these refugees to settle at this time.  However, this is certainly not 
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the case in circumstances surrounding some of the other minor instances that Tacitus 
provides in the Germania.  For instance, he notes the Agrippinenses who were allowed 
to settle along the Rhine to “[serve as] a guard against invaders.”10  Returning back to 
the “empty land” cleared by Roman legions along the borders, Tacitus lists several 
tribes that through “daring” and “indigence, seized upon this district of uncertain 
property [agri decumates].”11  There tends to be a general unwillingness to exploit these 
refugee groups for agricultural benefit during the early Empire.12  More importantly, the 
sole point of allowing these peoples to settle, as maintained by Tacitus, is “for military 
use alone, they are reserved, like a magazine of arms, for the purposes of war.”13  This 
statement definitively proves that the Romans were aware of at least the military value 
of taking in refugees.  By granting them receptio, the Romans were able to catch these 
groups of refugees in a weak position and force them into submission.  While at the 
same time they were building not only buffer zones from greater enemies—thus saving 
Roman resources by hiring Rome’s fighting out to barbarians—but also expanding the 
size of the recruitable population in a process that helped to stabilize and at the same 
time Romanize the frontiers. 
Similar processes to those mentioned in the case of the Ampsivarii again appear 
surrounding the issues that precipitated the Marcomannic war.  The Romans had long 
been accepting Marcomanni refugees such as their exiled king Maroboduus, who was 
given refuge by Tiberius, and the Quadan king Vannius who “was granted the refuge 
within the empire; he and his followers were allowed to settle in N[orthern]. Pannonia 
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where they could provide Rome with a useful diplomatic weapon in any future 
negotiations with the Quadi.”14  However, this was nothing when compared to the 
events prior to the war when the Marcomanni and their allied tribes (Quadi, Iazyges, 
Sarmatians, etc.) sought receptio among the Romans.  They were denied that request 
and a result, waged war on Rome for fourteen years.  It is generally presumed that the 
Marcomanni federation had been pushed off of its land by Goths and other peoples new 
to Europe.15  This is a process that was also seen in the Ampsivarii who were pushed 
from their lands by the Chauci, and is one that would appear many more times over the 
proceeding centuries.   
The final peace treaty between the Romans and the Quadi would grant the Quadi 
the right to settle in Roman territory in “the hope that they might be detached from the 
Marcomani.” but did not grant this right to the Marcomanni.16  Rome did, however, 
restore one-half of the “neutral zone” that was along the Danubian frontier.17  This 
neutral zone was presumably of similar function as the agri vacui of Tacitus, in that 
they served as projections of the power of the empire as well as a clearing for 
scouting/defensive purposes along the borders, which Tacitus tells us attracted many 
Gauls to “cultivate” the land.18  Although, the Romans exacted a large one-time tribute 
from the Quadi and Marcomanni, demanding them to partially disarm while 
simultaneously placing other limitations on them.19  The fact that the agri vacui were 
only partially restored shows that Rome was willing to make some concessions, but was 
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certainly not going to allow undesirable elements to settle in land that it considered a 
projection of its territory.   
The Iazyges, another federate tribe, did not fare as well because they were 
forced to settle twice as far as had the Quadi and Marcomanni.20 Cassius Dio informs us 
that “the emperor had wished to exterminate them [Iazyges] utterly….[because] they 
were still strong at this time and had done the Romans great harm.”21  This notable 
degree of Roman reluctance to grant the Iazyges receptio illustrates quite clearly that 
the emperors certainly had a grasp on the dangers of allowing a dispossessed, but still 
militarily strong, group to settle near or in Rome.  Furthermore, the fact that they were 
required, and able to promptly furnish “eight thousand cavalry”22 caused further concern 
among the Romans despite the fact that they were essentially benefiting from this new 
influx of recruits.  Ultimately, however, they are granted the right to settle near the 
Danube, though, in such a way that they were surrounded on three sides by Roman 
territory.23  Another latecomer to the fighting, the Astingi, are also introduced to us by 
Dio in his account of the Marcomanni wars.  He recounts how they came with “their 
entire households, hoping to secure both money and land in return for their alliance.”24  
Thus it was not only the nearby refugees that sought Roman land, but also tribes from 
further out that wished to settle on Roman lands.  The treaties are interesting because 
they demonstrate how the neighboring barbarians had to make treaties with Rome even 
though they wished to settle beyond the borders of Rome or on just the fringes of 
territory not technically even a part of Rome.  The level of control exerted over these 
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tribes is interesting especially when it is juxtaposed with the fact that Roman forces had 
suffered heavy defeats early on in the war.   
Aside from just simple receptio and land rights found in the treaties, the 
economic constraints that were applied to the defeated barbarians are also of marked 
significance.  These economic constraints principally took the form of barring the Quadi 
and other defeated tribes from attending Roman markets.25  According to Dio, in order 
to prevent the Marcomanni or Iazyges from masquerading as a Quadi, all parties were 
barred from attending Roman markets.26  Scholar Lynn Pitts maintains that these 
restrictions show that Romans and barbarians must have been trading prior to their 
implementation.27  In addition, she notes that they were most likely only temporary, as 
archaeological evidence proves that there was still robust trade activity well into the 
third century.28  Thus:  “economic aspects were almost certainly as important as the 
military.”29  Following this reasoning, the Romans must have certainly understood the 
economic repercussions of receptio.  The ability to enforce such a ban must also be 
taken into consideration as well, but there was probably some effective degree of 
control in this area for at least a short while.  Although limiting trade was a common 
Roman policy along the northern frontiers, it does not seem to have been maintained for 
long in this case.30  The issue of trade rights as found in the treaties regarding the 
settling of refugees continues to appear throughout the sources as a major point of 
contention between the Romans and refugees themselves.  Lastly, referring back to the 
other levies that the Quadi and Marcomanni were subjected to upon their peace deal, the 
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Romans were certainly aware that they could have collected not only military levies 
from these refugees, but also could have extracted tribute and taxes. 
Not only did Rome seek to control these refugees economically, but they also 
had a heavy hand in their politics as well.  For instance, the accession of any new 
Marcomannic or Quadan leader required prior Roman approval; general bans on 
assemblies are also found in the classical texts.31  This in itself is not an unheard of 
practice during the Empire, but it just further reinforces how much these refugee 
populations gave up in order to settle on Roman lands.  We also see the Marcomanni 
returned to the refugee position again in the fourth century when their queen Fritigil 
sought Roman protection for her people through Ambrose.32  They were of course 
required to convert to Christianity before receiving any help from the Romans, but 
again, control of over barbarians through the usage of receptio now extended into the 
realm of Christianity.  By this time there was certainly a defined policy of controlling 
incoming refugees by whatever means possible in an attempt to keep them subdued.  
Controlling them through political meddling and conversion was just one of the many 
tactics that the emperor and local governors employed.  
The level of control that the Romans were thus far able to achieve over refugee 
populations appears to have deteriorated rather rapidly in a matter of a century or so.33  
Perhaps the most famous and most well documented instance of refugees described in 
the classical sources is Ammianus Marcellinus’ account of the Goths that fled across the 
Danube in the fourth century.  The arrival of large numbers of starving Gothic refugees 
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and the wretched treatment they received at the hands of the local Roman authorities 
sparked not only widespread Gothic pillaging, but also the Gothic Wars.  The reason for 
the Gothic crossing seems to have been twofold.  The first reason—in almost the exact 
same manner as found among the Ampsivarii and Frisians and the Marcomanni and 
Quadi—was the pressure that was placed on the Gothic population by the arrival of the 
Huns in Gothic territory.  Furthermore, the way the authors tend to present the pressures 
the Huns exerted on the Goths makes it seem like a very rapid process; however, as 
Peter Heather maintains, “[the] Huns did not arrive en masse” but “[r]ather, a slow 
build-up of pressure precipitated a crisis among certain Goths, whose retreat westwards 
provoked a similar response among many of their neighbours,” in essence, a “domino 
effect.”34  As a result, Shaw dubs this line of reasoning the “domino theory of 
causation,” particularly in reference to Late Antiquity.35  This theory contrasts markedly 
with Wolfram who remarks how the Goths could not live in a land in which an enemy 
“could destroy at will and without advance warning.”36  Thus, based upon this statement 
and others, the Huns struck with rapidity not consistent with the domino theory of 
causation.  This certainly does help to explain the tone of crisis found in the classical 
sources.  In addition, the former theory ignores too much or takes too liberal an 
interpretation of the language found in the classical texts.  The pressure on the Goths 
due to the arrival of the Huns precipitated a food shortage—in one author’s words, the 
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“Gothic food supply collapsed”—among the Goths, thus creating a wave of refugees.37  
The Gothic envoys did, however, seek imperial permission to cross the Danube before 
doing so.38  This action could be construed to mean that they had respect for Rome, but 
it is more likely that they sought to avoid the appearance of an invading force as it 
certainly would have appeared to Roman officials had they just crossed the Danube 
without gaining prior imperial permission.  Jordanes, in fact, tells us that the Goths 
“preferred to ask for lands from the Roman Empire, rather than invade the lands of 
others with danger to themselves.”39  Most likely, the Goths chose to go to Rome for the 
same reasons that those before them had done—they saw Rome as a land of wealth and 
prosperity. 
A food crisis, as mentioned above, was one of the leading causes behind the 
Gothic refugee crisis.  As demonstrated in earlier examples, a general lack of food 
(“subsistence crises falling short of famine”) was nothing new to Rome’s border 
lands—and the entire ancient world for that matter.40  In the case of the Gothic refugee 
crisis, the motivations are not entirely different with the exception of a few things.  
Ammianus clearly tells us why the Gothic refugees turned to Rome in time of need:  
“Thrace offered them a convenient refuge, for two reasons:  both because it has a very 
fertile soil, and because it is separated…from the fields that were already exposed to the 
thunderbolts of…war.”41  This statement is further supported by Garnsey who notes that 
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“war by itself may produce food crisis.”42  The Goths’ need for “fertile soil” is 
mentioned frequently by Ammianus.43  C. R. Whittaker also claims that in addition to 
the destruction due to the conflict that caused famine, a general population boom along 
the Danubian frontier exasperated the situation by overtaxing already scarce resources.44  
Natural and geological disasters are also suspected to have played a role in this process.  
One theory maintains that the tribes along the Northern Rhine were pushed inland due 
to the “Dunkirk 2 transgression.”45  This theory maintains that changing sea levels near 
modern Belgium and the Netherlands caused rapid loss of land to the sea which forced 
the native tribes southward creating a refugee situation further south.  Events such as 
these, particularly famines, provided opportunities for Rome to “capitalize on hunger 
and disease by using economic warfare to control rebellious ‘barbarians.’”46  Rome 
certainly did capitalize on these events, but in the instance of the Goths, it backfired on 
her. 
The arrival of numerous Gothic refugees along the banks of the Danube in 376 
would mark the start of the Gothic War (376-382).  The Roman loss of control over the 
Goths later led to pillaging and death for all parties involved and culminated in the 
defeat of Roman forces at Adrianople.  Unlike some of the above instances, Ammianus 
clearly recounts the Roman reasons for allowing the Goths to cross the Danube.  He 
tells us that the Gothic envoys had promised to furnish Rome with auxiliaries for the 
army, so much so that “the affair caused more joy than fear” as the emperor was to be 
brought “so many young recruits from the ends of the earth…; also that instead of the 
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levy of soldiers contributed annually by each province, there would accrue to the 
treasuries a vast amount of gold.”47  Particularly in this case, the Romans were not 
simply just granting receptio, they were expecting complete submission.48  This meant 
that the Goths were expected to disarm completely, which they did not.49  It has already 
been established previously here that the Romans were well aware of how refugees 
could serve as rich sources of recruits in addition to the fact that by the end of the fourth 
century, large components of the army were foreign recruits.50  This was also not the 
first time the Goths were drawn into the Roman army.  According to Jordanes, 
Constantine was furnished with forty-thousand Goths for which the Goths were granted 
the right to settle in Pannonia.51  This certainly indicates also that the Romans were 
confident that they could control such a population and that also the Goths were willing 
to comply with Roman demands.  However, something went terribly wrong and the 
Romans were bested by the Goths.  This was presumably caused by a breakdown of 
Roman “bureaucracy” due to the sheer numbers that crossed the Danube.52  The 
situation was exacerbated by the fact that the main body of the Roman army was in the 
East fighting Persia. The Emperor Julian ignored warnings from his advisors to attack 
the Goths; instead, he sought the supposed greater glory that came from taking on 
Rome’s old enemy.53  Not all Romans were comfortable with granting receptio to such 
large numbers of barbarian refugees either.  The sources indicate several instances of 
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cities that hoarded food and closed their gates to the starving Goths.54  Due to the large 
numbers of Goths, the Romans lost control of the situation in a humiliating blow to 
Roman pride.  This event sparked the Gothic Wars that would see Rome humiliated 
further at the battle of Adrianople. 
The language the classical authors employ to describe the plight of the Goths is 
important to examine especially because it helps to set this event apart from ordinary 
invasions for plunder.  Sympathetic language abounds in the accounts, such as the “cries 
and lamentations, begging for pity asking to be allowed to cross” or how the envoys 
“with humble entreaty begged to be received [suscipi se humili prece poscebant]” and 
were sold dog meat by greedy Roman generals.55  We find additional descriptions 
stating that “everything that could serve as food…had been used up, [and] that the 
barbarians [were] driven alike by ferocity and hunger” and “some who, because of the 
great crowd, struggled against the force of the waves and tried to swim were 
drowned.”56  Some authors have construed the dog meat incident, in particular, to mean 
that the Romans had specific plans to starve the Goths into submission.57  This 
argument does fit well with the Roman aim to control incoming refugee populations, 
but admittedly not outside the range of Roman cruelty.58  Succinctly put, this disaster 
was caused by “[o]fficial incompetence, greed and a lack of planning” which led to the 
“brutal mistreatment of the starving refugees.”59  Overall, most of the authors tend to 
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take a sympathetic tone towards the Goths, at least until they began to pillage Roman 
territory and the tone quite often becomes rather scathing.   
Food—or a lack thereof—was not the only reason for the Goths to seek refuge 
within Rome.  Orosius tells us that just prior to the crossing of the Danube, many Goths 
had chosen to flee to Rome due to the persecutions that were carried out under king 
Athanaric among the various Gothic tribes.60  These persecutions had, in fact, begun 
years before Athanaric’s rise to power.61  In religion, too, the Romans played a 
significant role in Gothic affairs, and religion served as one more tool to control the 
barbarian populations.  The settlement of the religious Gothic refugees was part of 
“Constantine’s determined effort to hold political control beyond the provincial 
boundaries.”62  In this instance, Rome used the refugees as the means to foment internal 
unrest among the Goths.  In addition to religious zeal, the emperors more than likely 
sought to employ religious infighting to weaken the refugees by dividing them.  This 
example illustrates at least to some degree the power that religion could have on control 
refugees as well as the contemporary understanding of the dangers of allowing these 
refugees to remain united and strong.    
The Goths were not the only ones who were forced to resettle due to outside 
population pressures and displacement.  As early as the mid-third century, the loss of 
Dacia forced a massive resettling of Roman civilians across the Danube.63  This action 
would set the new provincial border at the Danube and thus helped contribute to the 
uncontrolled refugee wave.  During the arrival of the Goths, Eunapius tells us that the 
“areas which they [Goths] overran were depopulated” and that the “countryside was for 
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the most part devastated and remains uninhabited and untravelled.”64  Although 
displaced populations are the natural consequence of war (particularly so in the Roman 
East), the loss of this land to the Goths—and by consequence, the loss of control of 
presumed inferior—must have had a grave effect on the Roman psyche.65  This becomes 
even more significant when contrasted with Roman ideology of essentially a mandate 
that called for constant expansion of Roman borders.66  But this is not to say that this 
event destroyed Rome; instead, it was a surprise defeat that had greater psychological 
effects than actual consequences, especially on Ammianus who had clear motivations 
for trying to (over)emphasize this gravity of the event.  There was certainly no 
perception among the Goths, or any other barbarian groups that Rome was somehow on 
the verge of collapse.67  The reasons for the refugees to seek asylum in Rome was for 
pure economics and survival. 
The loss of control over refugees witnessed here would take its final shape in the 
form of the first federate (foederati), and thus independent group, in the Empire.68  This 
arrangement was worked out in the treaty of 382 between the Romans and the Goths.  
The Goths were given autonomy through federate status but were still kept within 
Roman control.  In addition to this provision, exemptions from issues that were raised 
repeatedly in earlier treaties appear here as well.  For instance, the Goths were granted 
land—which they had to cultivate themselves—which was tax empted.69  This must 
have been a big blow to swallow for Rome as she had given up one of the most 
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important means of controlling and simultaneously profiting from refugees.  However, 
Rome did manage to benefit from another provision.  The Goths were required to 
support the Romans militarily by furnishing large numbers of troops.70  Thus, although 
the Romans were not able to profit economically from the settling of the Goths, they 
were certainly able to use them militarily.  This also had the added effect of weakening 
the military might of the Goths by siphoning off Gothic military reserves and by feeding 
the ever present need to fight a war.  Thus, although Rome was forced to make 
concessions to the Goths, it still managed to profit in someway from the deal while 
concurrently dampening the possibility of future rebellion. 
The Goths would continue to move across Europe for years to come, creating 
waves of Roman refugees who headed towards the Capital.  The accounts of the Illyrian 
Roman refugees who flooded into Italy because of the Goths are well attested.71  In this 
we can observe a further illustration that the arrival of the Huns in Europe created a 
wave of population pushes such that the Goths were first affected and forced to flee 
westward.  They in turn pushed on the Romans who were then forced to flee further into 
the empire.  These consequent waves of dispossessed peoples may have only been a 
temporary event as some scholars have noted that there was a continuity of Roman 
occupation in the Lower Danube in addition to the fact that not a single Thracian city 
fell during this time.72  This is most likely due to the fact that the Goths lacked any 
sophisticated form of siege weaponry, let alone the tactics necessary to carry out a 
successful assault as indicated by Ammianus.73  It is also very likely that the number of 
Roman dispossessed would have been greater had there not been fortified cities that the 
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rural peasantry could flee in times of invasion.  Thus, although we see consequent 
population pushes, by the time they reached Rome, the established Roman infrastructure 
helped to soften the blow at least somewhat.   
 The advancement of the Huns from the steppe undoubtedly had a significant 
impact upon Europe since they brought with them waves of refugees.  The Hunnic 
refugees that are found in the classical sources were slightly different from some of the 
earlier examples in that these Huns were fleeing their own people.  Priscus’ account of 
the peace negotiations between the Romans and the Huns tells us that one of the major 
demands of the Huns was the return of Hunnic and allied refugees.  In general, as 
Wolfram notes, “[n]egotiations between Romans and Huns dealt mostly with demands 
of the Hunnic leaders that barbarian deserters be handed over.”74  The Thracian Goth 
Priscus tells us that Hunnic ambassadors were “threatening to break the present peace if 
they [Romans] did not hand over all who had fled to them.”75  The process of handing 
over the refugees deprived Rome, particularly the Western Empire, of large numbers of 
mercenaries.76  This subsequently weakened the military might of the army which was 
notorious for its inability to recruit enough men to keep its ranks full.  The refugees in 
the instance of the Huns were composed mostly of deserters and rival claimants of 
Hunnic leadership as well as deposed rulers of tribes allied with the Huns.  For example, 
we see two men of royal blood who were returned to the Huns only to be impaled upon 
extradition.77  Death was the fate that awaited all of those who had sought refuge with 
the Romans.  This fact became so well known that those refugees refused to go back, 
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instead preferring death by Roman hands until the Romans just stopped taking Hunnic 
refugees to avoid having to return them to the Huns.78   
 The humiliating conditions of the peace treaties the Romans signed starkly 
illustrate just how much control over the barbarian populations the Romans had lost.  
We are told that “overwhelming fear…gripped their [Roman] commanders” during the 
negotiations with the Huns and that “they were compelled to accept gladly every 
injunction…in their eagerness for peace.”79  In addition to the return of the refugees, 
Rome was further damaged by being forced to pay ransom for the return of captured 
Roman soldiers.  Although Rome was weakened militarily, it still seems to have been 
able to retain traditional economic means of control.  In addition to the above conditions 
of peace (of which there were only three), the Huns made trade a significant point of 
issue.  The Huns demanded from the Romans the right to attend “safe markets with 
equal rights for Romans and Huns.”80  This demand, coupled with the demand for 
ransom in gold, shows just how dependent the Huns were on Roman trade.  The Huns 
needed to secure trade with Rome in order to spend their newfound wealth, but the 
Romans most certainly did not share in the necessity to trade with the Huns.  In a 
separate treaty several years later, we find a similar example of the Emperor Leo who 
refused to grant the Hunnic embassy the right to Roman trade.81  The level of control 
and the effectiveness of that control that Rome had over trade in the former instance is 
somewhat uncertain but it still demonstrates that Rome used the power of her markets to 
control barbarians.  Whether or not the emperors were conscious of this fact is a little 
less certain but we do see in the latter instance that the Emperor Leo’s decision was 
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based upon the damage that the Huns had inflicted upon his territory.  Also illustrated in 
these two examples is the general fact that when Rome was stronger, it was better able 
to exert its will on others.  But even when it was weak militarily, it could still exert a 
significant amount of influence by restricting trade with barbarians.   
 Although the issue of Hunnic refugees had slightly different circumstances than 
does some of the earlier instances, it still does much to demonstrate the basic policies 
which Rome employed in its policy of control over barbarian groups.  The draw that the 
Empire had for the Huns was most certainly similar if not exactly the same for all other 
refugees that came to Rome.  The Empire was a symbol of wealth and military might 
and as such it served as protection for those who were fleeing powerful enemies.  The 
Huns, like those before them as well, would eventually be turned into refugees when the 
remnants of Atilla’s Huns were forced to seek asylum with the Eastern Emperor after 
their defeat in the Hunnic civil wars.82  The threat that refugee groups brought by this 
time to Roman interests has lead one scholar to quip that the limes (Roman borders) had 
to be adapted to face “a new kind of danger:  from migrating families, the land-hungry, 
home-seekers and refugees.”83  Thus, while circumstances did change, motivations 
tended to remain the same. 
 Moving towards the Eastern end of the Empire we can see different 
circumstances but with many similarities.  Although, from previous examples, it 
appears that refugee activity was limited to the northern border, but as Whittaker notes:  
“[o]n this frontier [the Northern frontier] we have more recorded cases than on any 
other of…receptio into Roman territory.”84  The border with Persia too had a long 
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history of refugee activity.  So long in fact that it will only be covered briefly here due 
to space constraints; instead, only certain major issues that run throughout the previous 
examples will be touched upon here.  The main difference between the two frontiers 
besides just the difference in historical length was the fact that most of these refugees 
were moved forcefully after the fall of a city.  Assuming that loyalties to either empire 
in this volatile region were not excessively mercurial, it is simply good policy to remove 
a hostile population from an area that has just been annexed by a rival empire.  As 
S.N.C. Lieu argues, the Persians had a very sophisticated policy of forcefully deporting 
Romans to Persian territory to build or rebuild Persian cities in the image of a culture 
that they admired.85  Persian motives were thus primarily economic, with some room to 
make use of these peoples as propaganda devices demonstrating how Persia’s power 
had defeated Rome.  This stands in rather stark contrast to the Romans who, for the 
most part, lacked any sophisticated plan for what to do with Persian refugees and 
captives other than have them serve as propaganda and cheap labor.86  Thus it was not 
only the Romans who were aware of the economic benefit that could be attained by 
accepting refugees (or forcefully taking them) into their territory.  What is of major 
significance here is that we see a marked contrast to Roman policy along the northern 
border in Europe.  In that region we have observed that there was some awareness—
whether conscious or otherwise—of the economic benefit that could be attained by 
accepting refugees.  The policy in that area also predated the instances that are found 
along the Romano-Persian border.  It seems to be quite a mystery as to why economic 
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exploitation of refugees was not continued in the East.  The fact that the Persians lacked 
a reputation as fierce fighters in comparison to their northern neighbors explains why 
the Persians were not enlisted in the legions, as well as the fact that by this time the 
Romans had already had large numbers of European fighters in the region.87  But it still 
does not help to explain why the Romans did not exploit these peoples economically 
unless one assumes that they were uninterested in those gains as in the instances of the 
Ampsivarii, Marcomanni, Quadi, etc.  However, these earlier instances are just 
instances, and not carried out systematically and consistently, thus do not necessarily 
constitute a coherent policy.  It must be keep in mind as well that the ultimate power to 
decide policy resided “at the centre” with the emperor, and, as such, his decisions were 
limited by what information he was provided—the quality of which could vary 
drastically.88 
Religion always plays a major role in the flight of refugees.  The Romano-
Persian border was no exception.  Persia served as a haven for Christians persecuted 
prior to the conversion of the Emperor Constantine.89  The Persians as well were no 
doubt more than willing to accept them as it coincided well with their policy of taking 
in Romans in order to advance their own culture and economy.  We also see instances 
of religious refugees reappear during the persecutions of Yezdegird II.  This time it was 
the Persian Christians who sought refuge among the Romans who were subsequently 
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unwilling to return them to their land of origin in the wake of Persian demands.90  What 
the Romans actually did with these refugees, however, has not been left to posterity, and 
thus any further analyses are difficult to make.  Due to the large porous nature of the 
border between Persia and Rome, flight across the border “provided one of the few 
escape routes for those needing asylum from the forces of law or political oppression or 
religious persecution.”91  Wartime also was another great opportunity to cross the 
border, such as the case of the Roman Antoninus who went to the Persian side, 
according to Ammianus.92  These examples are no different in terms of motivation as 
seen in earlier instances.  In the former example we see Persians who wished to preserve 
their lives by fleeing to Rome whereas in the later we see an individual whose motives 
were more complex but who was most likely trying to improve his material status. 
Based upon the numbers furnished by the classical sources, the Romans 
appeared to have suffered a net loss of people to the Persians.93  The Persians by far had 
the upper hand in terms of control over the flow of refugees along this traditional border.  
Whether or not either side had a clear grasp of the benefits of accepting refugees—as 
opposed to forcibly taking peoples—into their territory is much more difficult to 
ascertain.  The Romans were certainly aware of the benefits of granting refuge to 
barbarians along its northern border, but they appear to have forgotten that in the East.  
On the other hand, the Persians had a clear policy of taking Romans in order to enrich 
their own economy.  This is in addition to what Lieu argues was an idolization of 
Roman culture and Romanness, the net effect of which was the gradual Romanization 
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(Hellenization) of Persian elite culture.94  It is also important to note briefly that, as 
according to Lieu, these captured people and refugees tended to live very comfortable 
lives after being settled in Persia.95  Unlike the suffering that Ammianus describes in the 
instance of the Goths, these peoples may have not suffered nearly as much as their 
northern counterparts.  Lieu is careful to point out throughout his article that the journey 
to the final destination and the actual capture, etc., was quite often a highly traumatic 
experience. 
It is perhaps too simple to just speak of these refugee movements as singular 
events with a simple end.  However, what happens to these groups after they acquire 
safety in Rome (or are pushed back into the frontiers) is also important in illustrating 
how strong Roman influence could be.  In the first two instances cited at the beginning 
of this paper, both groups of refugees were prohibited from trading with Rome and the 
former group was even prohibited from settling along Roman borders.  These facts 
themselves illustrate the control that could be exercised among the refugees.  What is 
important in these instances is that “of course, not all such barbarians [refugees] were 
settled precisely on the frontier,…many were exploited…in the interior as laeti.”96  This 
makes a fair bit of sense as well when one considers the potentially dangerous 
environment that would be created by allowing a hostile group of barbarians to settle 
wholly intact along sparsely defended borders.  Thus by forcing or promoting settlement 
inland, so to speak, Rome was able to diffuse this potentially catastrophic condition as 
well as serve labor requirements deeper within the Empire.  This can be contrasted with 
the foederati status that was given to the Goths which essentially allowed them 
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autonomy within the borders of the Empire.  Not only were they not divided up, but 
they were also allowed to essentially roam freely which helps to explain the disastrous 
events (such as the sack of Rome) further on in Late Antiquity.   
Perhaps most powerful among all of the Roman control mechanisms is 
cultural—i.e. Romanization.  By trading with these barbarians, Rome was able to begin 
the process of accustomizing these groups by introducing them to Roman goods, culture, 
and ways of life.  The wholesale intake of refugees only served to catalyze this process.  
Whittaker summarizes this entire process elegantly when he notes: “The truly 
remarkable fact about these huge, peaceful shifts of population is how difficult it is to 
see any real sign of them in the archaeological remains.  They disappear ‘like ghosts’ 
into the countryside….[,] they become rural provincials.”97  Perhaps this was the 
ultimate goal of the barbarians of the Western Empire.  As stated throughout, there was 
a clear sense among the barbarian groups of an admiration for Rome and thus it is no 
stretch to claim that there existed a cognitive desire to become Romanized, if not 
Roman.  In addition, in order for Romanization to be effective at all, these barbarian 
populations had to be willing to at least some degree to be Romanized.  As Whittaker 
noted, Romanization could cause less culturally advanced groups such as the Quadi, 
Ampsivarii, etc. to essentially stop existing.  This was perhaps Rome’s most power tool 
of control and one which they had the least direct control over as it could neither truly 
be consciously wielded nor could it be immediately effective when the crises demanded.  
The power of Romanization is further emphasized when compared to the 
situation with Roman refugees in Persia.  A poignant example of this was the wholesale 
transplant and recreation of Antioch in Persia by the Persian King Chosroes.  The entire 
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city was composed of thirty-thousand Roman “captives” guarded by a few Persian who 
sent a message to the Emperor Tiberius II to have him liberate them.98  This rather 
comical anecdote perhaps exaggerates the dangers of allowing hostile dispossessed 
populations to exist undivided—in this case, not even on the border, but deep within an 
empire.  As noted above, this entire process helped to Romanize, to a degree, Persia.  
Whether or not the Persians wanted to be Romanized is a different issue.  The Roman 
captives certainly wanted to retain their Romanness despite captivity as evidenced 
above.  However, the East had already had a well established culture that the Western 
barbarians lacked.  Thus any attempts at Romanization would have to overcome a long-
established culture—a feat that is by no means easy, even when the population is 
willing. 
Critics have repeatedly pointed out the flaws and advantages of receptio.  
Williams provides a lengthy, rather negative assessment of it receptio describing it as 
“fatal.”99  He goes on to state that “[i]nvaders, refugees, economic opportunists, migrant 
workers…:  the empire played host to them all….[in] a process [in which] barbarians 
and Romans were merging.”100  This negative assessment perhaps places too much 
emphasis on the Gothic invasions and later events without adequate address of earlier 
events.  Furthermore, the borders had always served as a point of contact for the 
absorption of barbarians.101  Therefore, barbarians and refugees would still continue to 
seek out Rome whether receptio was granted or not.  Williams also makes the claim that 
receptio was one of Rome’s last bargaining chips, but this ignores the fact that it as well 
as variations on the theme of allowing refugees to settle had been in practice for several 
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centuries.102  Other scholars have taken more neutral stances on the issue describing the 
arrival of the Gothic refugees as a “mismanaged receptio,” and not as a tool with which 
Rome would scourge herself with.103  It is perhaps most fair to argue that receptio was a 
tool of control that was only exercised sparingly the results of which could vary 
drastically.  In retrospect, the Roman command structure was certainly aware of some 
of the benefits that could be accrued by granting receptio to fleeing refugees.  However, 
it by no means ever adopted a unified, consistent policy that could stand up to modern 
day scrutiny.  It is perhaps best to simply note that decisions were made on a case by 
case basis, one that did not necessarily factor in experience that was gained by earlier 
generations.   
In all of these examples we can see a clear appreciation of the economic motives 
of all parties involved.  The treaties in particular have provided us with ample support 
that demonstrates clearly that Roman contemporaries understood the power of 
economics and trade.  The refugees sought out Rome’s perceived agricultural wealth 
and stability while the Romans used the refugees as a new source of recruits for the 
legions and a boost to the tax basis.  There was absolutely no humanitarian compassion 
in any of these cases as economic decisions served as the basis for all of these decisions.  
Furthermore, the results that followed each case could vary wildly, and were thus highly 
dependent upon the circumstances in each instance.  This study has primarily focused 
on economic conditions and motives, but certainly issues of racial superiority and fears 
no doubt had some role to play as well.  In addition, the wider role of Christianity in 
refugee affairs may in fact play a greater role than examined here.  Due to the sheer 
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scope of this study, these important issues cannot be given full justice within the above 
constraints.   
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